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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee C. Steven Fehlauer ("Fehlauer") agrees with the
statement of jurisdiction contained in Appellant's principal
brief.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Fehlauer accepts Schwartz's framing of the first issue

for review presented in his principal brief, "Did the trial court
abuse its discretion by conducting the trial on the same day that
Schwartz was a candidate in a primary election for the
Massachusetts Legislature?"

Fehlauer concurs that this Court

should apply the strict 'abuse of discretion' standard of review
when considering this issue.
2.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 2 ) .

Fehlauer disagrees with the framing of the second issue

presented for review, "May an express condition precedent
providing that the contractual obligation to sell property is
subject to the sale of another property on or before a specific
date, be satisfied by substantial performance?"

Schwartz claims

that this issue calls for a 'correction of error' standard of
review.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 2 ) .

The primary problem with Schwartz's framing of this issue is
that the trial court never made a finding that the contractual
clause in question was an express condition precedent.
172).

(R. 160-

Instead, the court's examination of the clause focused on

the materiality of the closing date mentioned in the clause (R.
164, 168-71); both parties' trial briefs highlighted materiality
of the closing date as a significant issue for Judge Young's
consideration.

(R. 76, 93-4) .

Judge Young correctly recognized the irrelevance of whether
the entire contractual clause at issue was a condition precedent.
The real concern in the proceedings below, and the proper issue
for review by this Court, was whether the closing date mentioned
in that clause was so material that it should effect the
avoidance of an otherwise enforceable land contract.

The trial

court's finding that the closing date was not material is a factual matter that this Court may only reject if clearly erroneous.
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993); Ong
Intern. (U.S.A.) v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 454 n.25 (Utah
1993).

Schwartz carries the burden of marshalling the evidence

to prove that the factual finding was clearly erroneous.

Ong

Intern.. 850 P.2d at 454 n.25.
3.

Schwartz's final issue for review deals with the trial

court's third alternate ground for judgment, that it could
"reform" the contractual clause to mirror the parties' understanding and intent.

(R. 171). Schwartz asks if the "trial

court [can] reform an express condition where the trial court did
not find a mutual mistake of fact?"

(Appellant's Brief, p. 3).

As discussed below, the trial court did not actually "reform" the
contractual clause in its third ground for relief.

Rather, it

emphasized the word "sale" in the clause, recognizing that pursuant to agreements already in place by July 6, the Hoytsville Road
property had been sold.

Since the trial court never reformed the

contract, the final issue raised by Schwartz is not an issue at
all.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. After Fehlauer And Schwartz Entered A Contract For The
Sale Of Land To Fehlauer, Schwartz Decided Not To Honor The
Contract.
Dr. C. Steven Fehlauer and his wife were searching for a
piece of property in 1993 on which to build a house and raise
their young family.

(R. 163). While driving in Coalville one

day, the Fehlauers noticed a parcel for sale that they believed
ideal for their needs. (R. 163, 319).

The property (hereinafter

referred to as "the Fehlauer parcel") was owned by Thomas
Schwartz, a Massachusetts resident.

(R. 162).

Schwartz had bought the Fehlauer parcel in 1992 as the
southern part of a single larger piece of property.

(R. 162).

Schwartz decided to sell the entire piece of property in 1993 and
listed it with Coldwell Banker in Park City.

(R. 162). Nancy

Madsen offered to buy the northern portion of the property
(hereinafter referred to as "the Madsen parcel")1 in early 1993.
(R. 162-3).

On May 20, 1993, Madsen and Schwartz signed an

Earnest Money Sales Agreement securing the sale of the Madsen
parcel.

(R. 96-7; Plaintiff's Exhibits 7 and 8)(copies of the

Exhibits are attached as "Addendum A").

By its terms, the

Earnest Money Sales Agreement documented the "sale" of the Madsen
parcel on this date.

(R. 96-7; Plaintiff's Exhibits 7 and 8, p.l

Hi(a) and (b); p.4 \ Q) . The Agreement designated July 1 as the

*The northern portion Madsen bought was divided and sold to her
as two portions to facilitate financing.
(R. 162) . Her two
portions are referred to as one parcel for sake of convenience. It
is important to note that, as to the southernmost portion of the
Madsen parcel, Schwartz carried all of the financing.
3

closing date for the Madsen parcel because this was the date
Schwartz had to make a balloon payment on the property to his
lender.2

(R. 96-7; Plaintiff's Exhibits 7 and 8).

concededly has some materiality.

July 1

However, Schwartz voluntarily

extended the closing date to July 6 because he feared the closing
might not occur on July 1 and that extra time might be needed.
(R. 165) .
The closing of the Madsen parcel did not occur by July 6,
but there was a grace period extending the closing date on the
northeasternmost property, at least.3

(R. 166). The Madsen

parcel closed on July 16, well within the grace period.

(R.

166) .
Fehlauer submitted an offer of $115,000 on the southern
portion, the Fehlauer parcel, on June 25, 1993.

(R. 163).

Schwartz reviewed the offer that day and insisted on the full

2

Schwartz's "lender" was the prior owner of the property,
Robert Williams, who sold to Schwartz on contract all of the Madsen
and Fehlauer parcels. (R. 162).
3

A written grace period in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement
for both parcels Madsen bought extended the closing date in event
of lender delay. (R. 165) . The closing for one of the parcels
could not occur by July 6 because of Madsen's lender's delay, so
the grace period applied to that parcel.
(R. 165). Schwartz
testified at his deposition that Madsen was also entitled to a
grace period on the closing of her other parcel. (R. 184, p. 37) .
It is entirely unclear why he so thought.
The evidence is
perfectly clear that he was the sole lender on the southernmost
Madsen parcel and that (1) lender delay only occurred on the
northernmost Madsen parcel, and (2) both the Madsen parcels had to
sell or neither would. Schwartz then held all the cards when the
lender on the northernmost parcel delayed. He recognizes this, but
nonetheless permitted extension of the Madsen closing date. (R.
184, p. 37). Had he not done so, Madsen would be in the position
of questioning materiality.
4

listing price of $120,000.

(R. 164). He sent a counteroffer to

Fehlauer and added, among other things, a paragraph 6:
Subject to Sale of House & Property located at 841 S.W.
Hoytsville Rd., Coalville [the Madsen parcel] on or before
July 6, 1993.
(R. 164)(emphasis added).
Schwartz had told his listing company, Coldwell Banker, that he
did not want to sell the Fehlauer parcel until the Madsen parcel
was sold.

(R. 163). His listing agent suggested the date of

July 6 simply to provide buffer time in case the Madsen property
did not close as scheduled on July I.4

(R. 184, 279) .

Schwartz

confirmed at his deposition that the July 6 date was not important to him:
Q.

Was the date of the 6th arbitrary in that it could have
been the 5th or the 7th, or was there something magic
about the 6th?

A.

The only reason the 6th was picked was because that's
what Coldwell Banker said. They said can you give us
on the Fehlauer transaction till the 6th because of any
glitches that may or may not occur.

(R. 184, p. 46).
Fehlauer accepted on June 25, and Fehlauer and Schwartz
signed an Earnest Money Sales Agreement that day.

(R. 96-7;

Plaintiff's Exhibit 12). By its terms, the closing was to occur

4

When it became apparent in late June that the Madsen parcel
would not close on July 1, Schwartz became angry and threatened to
back out of the Fehlauer contract based upon his belief that he
could do so if the Madsen property did not close by July 6. (R.
253-4). His co-listing agent, Julie McKay, asked him why it was
important to him that the Madsen property close by July 6, but
could not get a reason. (R. 254). Similarly, plaintiff's counsel
inquired at Schwartz' deposition and was told that since Schwartz
had to make a balloon payment on all parcels to Williams on July 1,
any date afterwards was "irrelevant." (R. 184, p. 77).
5

on August 13.

(R. 167). Fehlauer completed all closing docu-

ments and paid the purchase price on August 11.

(R. 167-8). It

is undisputed that Fehlauer did everything expected of him, in a
timely manner to complete the sale.

Schwartz refused to honor

the contract and never signed the closing documents.

(R. 168).

Fehlauer then commenced this action seeking specific performance.
(R. 1-13).
B. Schwartz And His Counsel Refused To Commit To The
Resolution Of Fehlauer7s Action For Specific Performance.
On February 4, 1994, after discovery had been completed,
Fehlauer requested a trial setting.

(R. 45-6) . Schwartz did not

object to this request, and a scheduling conference was held on
March 28.

(R. 49-50, 150). During this conference Schwartz's

counsel stated that her client was running for the Massachusetts
state legislature and would not set foot out of Massachusetts
until after the election.

(R. 211). His counsel did not state

that any particular date between March and the election would be
objectionable; she instead lodged a veto against the entire
three-month period from March until July.

(R. 211). Fehlauer's

counsel objected at the conference that such a late trial would
cause Fehlauer to lose the whole construction year.

(R 211).

Judge Young then suggested that the trial be held during the
week of April 4 because another trial that had been scheduled at
that time would not occur.
accepted this date.

(R. 211). Fehlauer's counsel

(R. 211). Schwartz's counsel, however,

would not agree to it.

(R. 211). Judge Young next stated that

his calendar was clear during the week of May 9.

6

(R. 211).

Fehlauer's counsel accepted.

Schwartz's counsel again claimed

that her client would not appear during that week because of his
campaign.

(R. 211). She also objected to scheduling a trial on

May 12, as she had signed up for a CLE seminar on insurance law
she refused to miss.

(R. 211).

C. Unable To Set A Trial Date To Which Schwartz Would Not
Object, Judge Young Scheduled A Two-Day Trial At A Time That
Schwartz Argued Would Inconvenience Him.
Unable to find a date when he did not have other judicial
obligations and with which Schwartz's counsel would agree, Judge
Young concluded the March 28 conference by setting a two-day
trial on May 10 and 11.

(R. 212). After this date had been set,

Schwartz's counsel filed a Motion for Continuance which stated
for the first time that the Massachusetts primary election would
take place on May 10.5

(R. 55). Judge Young denied the motion

but expressed that he could accommodate the trial any day during
the week of May 10.

(R. 82). He also noted that Fehlauer's

counsel had offered to present his case on May 10, which would
allow Schwartz to travel to Utah after the primary and present
his case on May 11.

(R. 157-8).

The trial court conducted a pretrial conference at the
Summit County Courthouse on April 26, 1994.

(R. 212). Judge

Young again tried to find a trial date with which Schwartz's
counsel would agree, suggesting all dates he had available in

5

Schwartz's counsel attached to her objection a letter from a
Massachusetts town clerk noting that Schwartz was a candidate for
State Representative and that the primary would occur on May 10.
The letter did not state that Schwartz's attendance was required at
the primary. (R. 62).
7

both Coalville and Salt Lake City through June 30; Schwartz's
counsel refused all of these.

(R. 212). Next, Judge Young

offered June 28 as a trial date.

(R. 212). This date was

inconvenient for Judge Young since he was required to attend a
Judicial Council meeting in Blaine County, Idaho, the next
afternoon.

It was similarly inconvenient for Fehlauer's counsel

since he was expected to preside over a Utah State Bar Commission
meeting in the same venue that same day.

(R. 158). Despite the

difficulty, Fehlauer's counsel agreed to this date.

(R. 158).

Schwartz's counsel again refused to commit that her client could
attend on June 28 or any other date before mid-July.

(R. 158,

212) .
Finally, Judge Young attempted to be flexible with the
scheduled trial date on May 10 by exchanging dates with another
trial scheduled for May 12.

(R. 212, 228-9).

He proposed that

Schwartz attend the primary on May 10, travel to Utah and prepare
for trial with his counsel on May 11 and the morning of May 12,
and appear at a trial to begin on the afternoon of May 12.
212-3).

(R.

Although this proposal would give Schwartz's counsel one

and a half days to prepare for trial with her client, she
protested that she needed at least two days of face-to-face
preparation for this two-day trial, (R. 213) despite her having
earlier produced Schwartz for deposition and presumably having
considerable opportunity to communicate with him by telephone,
mail and facsimile transmittal, the latter of which Schwartz used
extensively in negotiating the sale.

She further informed Judge

Young that she would not miss the insurance CLE seminar she had
8

scheduled for herself for May 12.

(R. 213). Optionless, Judge

Young concluded that the trial should proceed as scheduled on May
10-11.

(R. 213).

D. Schwartz's Counsel Appeared At Trial But Was Instructed
By Her Absent Client Not To Present A Case.
Schwartz's counsel appeared at trial on May 10 and renewed
her objection to the trial setting at the outset.

(R. 220).

Judge Young responded by observing that this lawsuit involves the
equitable remedy of specific performance and the Earnest Money
Sales Agreement had been signed nearly a year ago, necessitating
an early trial date.

(R. 223) . He further explained how he made

every effort to accommodate Schwartz's itinerary, offering every
date he had available, but that Schwartz had rejected each date.
(R. 226, 230-1).

While Judge Young recognized a party's interest

in attending his trial, he pointed out not only that he had
exerted every effort to satisfy that interest, but that
Schwartz's counsel might have considered missing her CLE seminar
in order to serve her client.

(R. 234-5).

Judge Young denied

the objection of Schwartz's counsel and permitted the trial to
proceed.

(R. 236). Schwartz's counsel at this time objected to

the use of Schwartz's deposition, giving the curious explanation
that because he was not present to testify at trial, his previous
sworn testimony should be excluded, even though by her own
representation he was outside the court's process.

(R. 237).

She then explained that her client had instructed her not to
present a case and moved to the back of the courtroom, where she
remained for the rest of the trial.

9

(R. 243-4).

E. Finding That Schwartz Breached His Contract With
Fehlauer, Judge Young Ordered Specific Performance,
On June 16, 1994, Judge Young entered a decree of specific
performance in Fehlauer's favor.

(R. 173-7).

He noted in his

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that although the contract for the Fehlauer parcel contained the July 6 date, time was
not of the essence.

(R. 168) . There was no evidence, including

from Scwartz's deposition, that the July 6 date was material; it
only mattered that the Madsen parcel sell before the Fehlauer
parcel, which it did.

(R. 169-71).

Since all material terms of

the contract were met, Schwartz had to comply with the contract.
As an alternate ground for relief, Judge Young noted that the
extension of the closing date by fifteen days contained in the
Madsen contract also extended the July 6 provision in the
Fehlauer contract that discussed the Madsen parcel.

(R. 171).

Since the Madsen parcel closed by on July 16, the Fehlauer
contract remained viable.

(R. 171). In the third alternate

ground for relief, Judge Young removed the July 6 phrase from the
Fehlauer contract so that the word "sale" would be emphasized.
(R. 171). Pursuant to agreements already in place by July 6, the
Madsen parcel had been sold.

(R. 171) . Thus, the terms of the

Fehlauer contract were met.

(R. 171). Because Schwartz breached

the contract without justification, Judge Young compelled specific performance.

(R. 171).

10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:

Judge Young did not abuse his broad discretion in

declining to postpone the trial of this specific performance
action to some unknown date that might be convenient for
Schwartz.

Judge Young offered several trial dates that would not

interfere with Schwartz's participation in the primary, but
Schwartz rejected them all.

The court's decision at this point

to retain the originally-scheduled date with the knowledge that
Schwartz would have to miss only the presentation of Fehlauer's
case and not his own did not amount to misuse of the trial
court's scheduling authority.

Schwartz's request that this Court

award him with a new trial after he instructed his attorney not
to present his case at the actual trial should not be granted.
POINT II: Regardless of whether the sale of the Madsen
parcel was a condition precedent, it was not a condition precedent that the Madsen parcel be sold on or before July 6 and time
was not of the essence.

There is no evidence that the July 6

date was material to Schwartz, so the fact that the Madsen parcel
closed shortly after July 6 cannot render the Fehlauer contract
null and void.
POINT III: Judge Young's focus on the word "sale" in paragraph 6 of the Fehlauer contract did not amount to a reformation
of the contract.

Rather, Judge Young noted as an alternate

ground for relief that the Madsen contract did sell by July 6.
Schwartz's arguments about whether paragraph 6 was a condition
precedent aside, the "sale" occurred within the specified time as
a matter of law.
11

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY DECLINING TO POSTPONE
THE TRIAL IN THIS MATTER
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 40(b), provides that
after a party shows good cause for postponing a trial, the trial
court has discretion to grant a continuance.

Schwartz's major

argument on appeal is that Judge Young abused this discretion by
setting a trial when he was participating in a primary election
on the first day of trial.

This Court can only reverse Judge

Young's decision if he acted unreasonably under the circumstances
of this case.

Radcliffe v. Akhavan. 875 P.2d 608, 610-11 (Utah

App. 1994).
Judge Young did not act unreasonably in retaining the
scheduled trial date of May 10-11 even though Schwartz's counsel
later informed the court that her client was participating in a
primary election on May 10. Schwartz was not prevented from
attending the trial; he has never offered proof that he was
required to be in Massachusetts for the primary election.

At any

ratef he could have travelled to Utah after the primary and
presented his case on May 11.
While Judge Young offered Schwartz every date available on
his calendar in a three-month period6, proposed switching dates
6

Schwartz opines that Judge Young "apparently" thought he had
to preside over the trial and was trying to cram the trial in
before his term in Summit County ended on June 30. (Appellant's
Brief, p. 13). While Judge Young reminded Schwartz's counsel at
trial that he had gone through his calendar and offered every date
he was available until the expiration of his term in Summit County
12

with another previously-scheduled trial, and suggested conducting
the trial on the day before his attendance was required at the
Judicial Conference meeting at great inconvenience to him (and
similar inconvenience to Fehlauer's counsel), Schwartz refused to
leave Massachusetts until the elections ended and the summer
legislative session ended.7

Schwartz never explained why his

campaigning for a seat on a state legislature was so intense that
he could not spare a day or two to accommodate a court of this
state.

Instead, his bare contention that he was confined to

Massachusetts until after the election and subsequent legislative
session were to hold Fehlauer, Fehlauer's counsel, and a Utah
tribunal at bay for more than three months.
Schwartz's intransigence notwithstanding, Judge Young
finally reached what he thought was an "ideal" solution by
offering to switch another trial scheduled on May 12 and hold the
trial in this case on the afternoon of May 12. Schwartz could
attend the primary in Massachusetts, travel to Utah afterwards,
spend a day and a half preparing in person with his counsel, and

(R. 226), he never took the position that the trial could not be
held afterwards. At any rate, Schwartz's counsel could not be
definite on her client's availability after June 30. She vaguely
stated that her client could make a trial after mid-July but still
would not commit him to a specific date. (R. 236). Fehlauer's
counsel did not want to schedule a trial that far into the future
without a representation that he would not later object to that
date, as well. (R. 228).
7

Schwartz maintains that as events worked out, he could have
been available to attend trial any time after June 7 because he was
defeated in the general election on that day. This after-the-fact
rationale is irrelevant; at the time the court was setting a trial
date, Schwartz's counsel would not agree to any date before midJuly.
13

present his case on May 12. Again, Schwartz's counsel rejected
this proposal, stating that a day and a half of preparation was
not sufficient;
preparation.

she needed at least two days of face-to-face

She also would not miss a legal education seminar

on insurance she wanted to attend on May 12.
Judge Young thus retained the original May 10-11 setting not
because he unreasonably wanted to prevent Schwartz from attending, but because Schwartz objected to any and all dates he or
Fehlauer's counsel proposed.

Even with the trial proceeding as

scheduled, nothing prevented Schwartz from attending the trial on
May 11. Schwartz chose not to be present.

He ordered his

attorney to attend but not to argue his case. After declining to
attend his trial, Schwartz now contends that Judge Young abused
his discretion by not continuing the trial to some later time
when he would find it convenient to attend.
The facts of this case do not convey an abuse of discretion
in setting the trial date; neither can Schwartz offer legal
authority to support his main argument on appeal.

Citing

Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977), Schwartz notes
that courts have held it to be an abuse of discretion not to
grant a continuance where counsel has objected, given notice, and
tried to have the trial date changed for good cause. (Appellant's
Brief, p. 10). Even if Schwartz's counsel did this,8 though,
8

Trying to change a trial date based upon the unsupported claim
that attendance at a primary is required the first day of trial,
when the party can attend the next day, does not constitute good
cause. At any rate, Rule 40(b) provides that even if the party
makes a showing of good cause for continuance, the trial court
still has discretion to deny the continuance.
14

Judge Young did not automatically abuse his discretion in not
granting the continuance because abuse of discretion does not
hinge upon these three factors alone.
For instance, a court may abuse its discretion in denying a
continuance where the party has made itself available on other
dates open on the court's docket.

See Bairas v. Johnson,

373 P.2d 375, 378 (Utah 1962) (court abused discretion in not
granting continuance where no evidence of malingering by party).
As discussed above, Schwartz would never commit to a specific
date, instead rejecting every date suggested by Fehlauer or the
court.
Additionally, the court can abuse its discretion by holding
a trial when the party cannot attend and when his live testimony
is particularly important.

Id. at 375, 378 (little reason to

grant continuance to absent party if testimony at trial not
crucial).

Schwartz could have attended the trial on May 11 but

chose not to be present.

His live testimony was not particularly

essential to the disposition of the case; the trial was not
before a jury, and Judge Young considered Schwartz's deposition
in reaching his decision.

In State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 714-

5 (Utah App. 1993), this Court affirmed the trial court's denial
of the continuance of a criminal trial even though a witness
could not be present to testify; it was sufficient that her
deposition was read to the jury.
The trial court may also abuse its discretion if the moving
party shows that it was materially prejudiced by the denial or
that the result would have been different if the continuance had
15

been granted.
1991).

State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App.

Schwartz has not made this showing.

To the contrary, he

prejudiced himself by instructing his attorney not to argue his
case at trial. After choosing to pass up his opportunity to
present a defense, he cannot now ask this Court for another bite
at the apple.
After numerous reasonable but fruitless attempts to find a
trial date with which Schwartz would agree, Judge Young decided
to stick to the originally-scheduled date--a date that might have
inconvenienced Schwartz but certainly did not preclude his
attendance.

Judge Young did not abuse his substantial discretion

in declining to postpone the trial in this specific performance
action to some unknown date.

POINT II
JUDGE YOUNG CORRECTLY FOUND THAT
THE JULY 6 DATE WAS NOT MATERIAL
TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEHLAUER CONTRACT.
The trial court's first ground for granting specific
performance of the Fehlauer contract was that the failure of the
Madsen parcel to close by July 6 was not fatal to enforcement
because the Madsen contract closed within a reasonable time after
July 6.

In its second alternate ground for relief, the court

determined that the extension of the closing date on the Madsen
parcel by fifteen days also extended the July 6 provision in the
Fehlauer contract regarding the Madsen parcel by the same amount
of time.

Since the Madsen contract closed within those fifteen

days, the Fehlauer contract remained viable.
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(R. 171). Both

grounds for relief draw upon the same factual finding, that the
July 6 date was not material.

(R. 168-9).

To challenge the

first and second grounds for relief, Schwartz must marshal the
evidence to show that the trial court's finding was clearly
erroneous.

Ong Intern., 850 P.2d at 454 n.25.

Rather than marshalling the evidence on the trial court's
finding of no materiality, which he cannot do for dearth of raw
material, Schwartz devotes his second argument on appeal to
arguing that the sale of the Madsen parcel was a condition
precedent to enforcement of the Fehlauer contract.

For purposes

of this appeal, Fehlauer does not dispute that the sale was a
condition precedent.

However, it was not a condition precedent

that the sale occur on or before July 6.9

Since this phrase was

not material, it was just essential that the sale occur within a
reasonable time afterwards.

9

Schwartz argues that the July 6 clause is also a condition
precedent, citing three Utah cases involving strict compliance with
conditions precedent. None of these cases deals with the pertinent
issue of whether a date accompanying an act precedent to enforcement of the contract also is a condition precedent. Furthermore,
the cases are factually dissimilar to this case because the act
precedent to performance never occurred. Woodard v. Jensen, 740
P.2d 272 (Utah App. 1987) (recording of lot never occurred);
Braithwaite v. Sorenson. 561 P.2d 1083, 1084 (Utah 1977)
(government tax lien never released); Welch Transfer and Storage,
Inc. v. Oldham, 663 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah 1983) (SBA's approval of
reciprocal loan assumption never occurred in manner contemplated by
parties) . It is not surprising that the courts in these cases
strictly enforced the conditions precedent when the act precedent
never took place. In this case the act precedent occurred very
shortly after the time designated in the contract.
17

A. The Trial Court's Finding That July 6 Was Not Material
Is Grounded In The Evidence.
Schwartz has the burden of showing that the trial court's
factual finding was clearly erroneous.

However, Judge Young drew

upon sufficient evidence to support his finding.

Schwartz

indicated to his listing agent that he did not want to sell the
Fehlauer parcel until he had sold the Madsen parcel.

The Madsen

parcel was scheduled to closed on July 1; his listing agent
suggested the date of July 6 as a buffer date in case the closing
of the Madsen parcel were delayed.

Schwartz acceded even though

this required him to borrow money to pay his own seller, Robert
Williams, on or before July 1.

This borrowing is the only

detriment Schwartz can point to, and it occurred with or without
the Fehlauer sale.

Schwartz has never claimed, as he cannot,

that the particular date of July 6 or the time between July 6 and
July 16 held any importance to him.

(R. 184, pp. 46, 76-7.)

In a case dealing with a similar contractual clause,
Honeyman v. Clostermann, 753 P.2d 1384 (Or. App. 1988), overruled
on other grounds, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
finding that a provision requiring a land sale to close "on or
before April 10" did not contain a material date. As in this
case, the parties designated the particular date as a target date
by which they expected the prerequisites to closing would be met,
not as a deadline they felt had to be met for the contract to be
enforceable.

Id. at 1387. Judge Young's finding of no materi-

ality is supported by the record and is therefore not clearly
erroneous.
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B. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Concluding That The July
6 Date Could Be Extended For A Reasonable Time Because Time Was
Not Of The Essence.
The trial court entered a factual finding, also subject to
clearly erroneous review, that the July 6 clause in the Fehlauer
contract was not a "time is of the essence" provision.

(R. 168).

Schwartz disputes this finding, pointing out that time can be of
the essence in land contracts when there is language requiring an
avoidance of the contract if the "deadline" is not met.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 18-9).

As a preliminary matter, there

was no deadline in the Fehlauer contract; the trial court entered
a subsidiary factual finding that the July 6 date was not a dropdead date but merely a target date.

(R. 169). Furthermore,

Schwartz claims that there was language in the Fehlauer contract
requiring an avoidance but fails to identify the language.

If

Schwartz is contending that the words "subject to" constitute the
avoidance language, circularity problems arise.

Schwartz would

effectively be arguing that anytime a contract recites an act and
a date by which the act is to be performed, time automatically
becomes of the essence.

Conditions precedent and "time of the

"essence" clauses are not mechanically equivalent in the law.
The trial court correctly found that the July 6 clause was
not a "time is of the essence" provision; the contract did not
explicitly state such language, the contract did not specifically
call for avoidance if a deadline were not met, and surrounding
circumstances did not imply that timeliness of performance was of
paramount concern.
App. 1987).

Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 552 (Utah

When time is not of the essence, dates contained in
19

land contracts can be extended for a reasonable period of time.
Century 21 All Western Real Estate v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah
1982); Huck v. Hayes, 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977).

The trial court

therefore did not err as a matter of law in concluding in its
second ground for relief that the July 6 date could be extended
for a reasonable period of time afterwards.
C. The Trial Court's Conclusion That The July 6 Provision
Could Be Extended Concurrent With The Extension On The Madsen
Parcel Was Proper.
Schwartz added the July 6 clause to the Fehlauer contract
when it still seemed possible for the Madsen contract to close by
July 1.

Although the Madsen contract was scheduled by its terms

to close by that date, Schwartz voluntarily allowed the fifteenday grace period in the contract to apply when it became apparent
that the closing could not occur by July 1.

The Madsen contract

could thus close by July 16, which it did.
The trial court's application of the fifteen-day extension
to the Fehlauer contract was not improper because that
application simply incorporated the changes to the Madsen closing
date.

In Walker v. Feiring. 632 P.2d 1270 (Or. App. 1981), the

court upheld the application of a closing date extension from one
land sales contract to another under similar circumstances.

The

vendors in Walker were selling several parcels of land as a
"package," just as Schwartz wanted to sell the Madsen parcel
close in time to the Fehlauer parcel.

The buyers contracted to

purchase several parcels in the package.

The earnest money sales

agreement required the closing on each parcel to occur within ten
days after the issuance of an occupancy permit and stated that
20

time was of the essence.

Nonetheless, the parties closed more

than ten days after the issuance of the permit.

The buyers

purchased more parcels in the package and once again the closing
did not occur within ten days after issuance of the permit.

This

time, however, the sellers refused to close, citing the explicit
time provision in the contract.
The trial court affirmed the trial court's judgment of
specific performance on these parcels because the sellers had
tolerated an extension of the closing date on the first batch of
parcels in the package.

Id. at 1272. By extending the closing

date the first time, the sellers effectively agreed to an
extension on the closing date contained in the contracts covering
the second batch of parcels.

Id. at 1273.

In this case this Court has even greater reason to uphold
the trial court's application of the closing date extension to
the Fehlauer contract because unlike Walker, the closing dates
here concerned the same piece of land, the Madsen parcel.

Since

Schwartz had agreed with extending the Madsen closing date to
July 16, the trial court acted properly in determining that
paragraph 6 in the Fehlauer contract was to be treated in
parallel fashion.10

10

Had Schwartz tried to abort the Madsen contracts for failure
to close by July 6, Madsen could have pointed out the immateriality
of that date. Schwartz would be hard-pressed, as here, to prove
any materiality.
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POINT III
SINCE THE SALE OF THE MADSEN
PARCEL OCCURRED ON OR BEFORE JULY 6,
THE ACT PRECEDENT TO PERFORMANCE OF
THE FEHLAUER CONTRACT OCCURRED.
Schwartz's final argument on appeal addresses the trial
court's third alternate ground for relief, that paragraph 6 of
the Fehlauer contract could be "reformed" to read: "Subject to
sale of house & property located at 841 S.W Hoytsville Rd,
Coalville to Nancy Madsen pursuant to agreements already in
place."

(R. 171, emphasis in original).

Schwartz latches onto

the trial court's use of the word "reform," arguing that the
trial court could not reform the contract without finding a
mutual mistake of fact.
The trial court did not substitute the July 6 provision with
the language "to Nancy Madsen pursuant to agreements already in
place" in its Findings and Conclusions to memorialize a rewriting
of the contract.

It did so to illustrate how a certain term in

the clause, "sale," could be emphasized by covering up the
language on which the parties had been focusing with language
that more fully explained the term "sale."
Thus, the trial court's third ground for relief was not that
the contract could be reformed, but that the condition calling
for the sale of the Madsen property on or before July 6 had
occurred.

By emphasizing the word "sale" in the provision, the

trial court recognized Schwartz's understanding and intention
that the Fehlauer property not be sold until the Madsen property
was sold.

(R. 163, 171).
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Schwartz and Madsen signed the Earnest Money Sales Agreement
for the Madsen parcel on May 20. On this date, the sale of the
parcel occurred as a matter of law, subject only to financing
requirements.11

The sale of property occurred when the earnest

money sales agreement was signed.

Pursuant to the earnest money

sales agreement already in place, the Madsen property had been
sold on or before July 6•
If this Court were to determine that the July 6 provision in
the Fehlauer contract was a condition precedent, the condition
was satisfied because the sale of the Madsen property occurred
well before July 6.

The trial court did not err in reaching this

third alternate ground for relief.
CONCLUSION
Schwartz has not presented any reason for this Court to
reverse the trial court's decree of specific performance in this
matter.

Schwartz should not receive an extra shot at a trial

because Judge Young did not misuse his broad discretion in
declining to postpone the trial in this matter to some unknown
date convenient for Schwartz.

This Court should not reverse the

trial court's ruling that the July 6 date in the Fehlauer
contract could be extended reasonably; the court's finding that
the date was not material drew on substantial evidence, and the
court's conclusion that this nonmaterial date could be lengthened
is justified by law.

Finally, even if this Court determined that

Mrs. Madsen qualified as a borrower without difficulty.
The appraiser for the lender required longer than anticipated to
locate comparables to justify his appraisal.
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the entire clause at issue in the Fehlauer contract were a condition precedent, that condition was met when the Madsen parcel
sold on May 20. Based upon the foregoing, Fehlauer respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the trial court's judgment.
DATED this 3rd day of January, 1995.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

H. 'Jafc^s Cl^gg
Julianne P. Blanch
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two (2) true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to be served upon the
following:
Robert G. Holt
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS,
BROWN Sc GEE
185 South State #1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
by causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on
the 3rd day of January, 1995.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

H. James Cifegg
Julianne P. Blanch
Attorneys for Appellee

mws: 06\work\hjc\fehlauer\brief

25

ADDENDUM

EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
*gend

Yes(X)

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT

No(0)

c c
-fctef-^V-\ i l3

DATE
The undersigned Buyer

_ hereby deposits witttbrokerage

EARNEST MONEY, the amount of T > ^ * h ^ ^ ^ P

^

**°/1

. Dollars ($

&"*
3

the form of.
w
>sited in
State Law
nch shall be deposited
in accordance
accordance with
with applicable
applicable State

*

" /
Received by S . p\

okerage

TM>^J<

< ^^ V V U O L

Phone Numb(
umber
OFFER TO PURCHASE

1. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST M^NEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at
^CVTSOttil-

\jj^

m the City of

C^f^l

'J Mfj,

County of

£ $ Q

m

t V ^ T

SHI £j±

, Utah,

ibject to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in
cordance with
Section G Said property is owned by
r u n v?c7isuui

<YV/(I

^re^.^

%J ; K^ft^T

^ \T

D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

as sellers, and is more particularly described

T

CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES
D Vacant Lot

"7.,,

•

Vacant Acreage

•

Other

• Commercial ^2jtesidential
• Condo
D Other
^IJJPROVED REAL PROPERTY
(a) Included Items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title
(b) Excluded items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale

M c

r^£^tJT\_

^ ^ ^

(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price
£3 public sewer

^/connected

Sceptic tank

EjjS>connected

^well
v

£3 other sanitary system .
EJ public water

# of shares _ 4 l S ^
*SvJV antenna

£3 connected

© private water

pSconnected

© connected

D other

K electricity

irrigation water / secondary system
Company ^

n&fl±y hiz l^dedicated road

0 master antenna SEjxewired

B natural gas

disconnected

0 ingress & egress by private easement
•

paved

D curb and gutter

B connected

•

other rights

^^A^

shall be furnished at the expense of_
.prior to closing j p shall not be furnished
n f\(c)(c)above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical
(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section
(d) Survey. A^

condition, except

{SL^7>

feJ&.T.'i^

£ifw£

2 PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. The total purchase price for the property is < P } s L \

A ^

bOO

h

Dollars ($ I f c f j / ^ n T j

j/'CC7

SP~

i 5/fhPO
O

for^^Si^TV

*—

uch 5shall be paid as follows
.) which

representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer,
which obligation bears interest at
•

principal,

% per annum with monthly payments of $
D interest,

D taxes,

D insurance,

•

condo fees,

D other

representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at
which include

D principal,

D interest,

% per annum with monthly payments of $

D taxes,

D insurance,

•

condo fees,

D other

representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or seller financing, to be paid as follows

ftoftBft ^pltc-vvnoirv),/ ^ > ^ t«vfT

*f u g l i f y

<-o<s

^

D^yfcfc—i?HS~

\(>% r-oi^sPC^T^^^C.

Other

i&3QCD.

Tl\£>wSA»^

which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT

which include
O

nLA^^'ft

L^U

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

If Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer a|
assume and/or procure same and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees
make application within

^)

i interest rate not to exceed

days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at
ffi/£>

% If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within

^f_J

this Agreement, this Agreemenlshall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice Seller agrees to pay up to
unts, not to exceed $

O'

In addition, seller agrees to pay $ __

- days after Seller's acceptance
2?

to be used for Buyer s other loan costs

mortgage loan discount

Legend

Yes (X)

No (O)

This is a legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before signing.

REALTOR®
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Sections)
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"""""'

A INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating
ir-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, wir
ow and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmii
>r(s), fencing, trees and shrubs
B INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reasoi
f any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom or &
>its production Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6 In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection
Slid inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer
Z SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has no
• will not be remedied prior to closing, (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shal
3 brought current on or before closing, and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or if
atisfactory working condition at closing
D CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided an adequate supply of water am
mtinued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right
E CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Sellei
is no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards
F ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages
teds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise
e interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally
•prove the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing In such case,
earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth
Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void
G TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion
a preliminary title report on the subject property Prior to closing, Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title,
ereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreejnt at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties
H TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued
such title insurance company as Seller shall designate Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and
i encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money
all, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated Seller agrees to pay any
r>cellation charge
EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing
:opy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior
closing, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases If the objections) is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void
I. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new leases
ered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer

ftC A M C r\K A C f t l l B DA A C C A B i i

3 CONDITION AND CONVEYANCE OF TITLE. Seller represents that Seller'^ holds title to the property in fee simple • is purchasing the property under a real
ate contract Transfer of Seller's ownership interest shall be made as set forth in Section S Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title to the property, subject
incumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced b y ^ a current policy of title insurance in the amount of purchase price D an abstract of title brought current,
i an attorney's opinion (See Section H)
^^
4 INSPECTION OF TITLE In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing Buyer shall take title
•ject to any existing restnctive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R s) Buyer • haS^Jhas not reviewed any condominium CC & R s prior to signing this Agreement
5 VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows \ j v y j ? C?
-rr> T ^ £ - - ^ ^ - M ? - ^ * ^ ^
^"^
Q, fc, & ( r* <
K\C> ^
SE

6 SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted
ceptions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following

f^^Q

*e-

9L

T*-*^ .T P"*" ^ c> »* S

7 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied

>5??? firmed g.b ftfrDKNpirff)

or to closing

8 CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before ^i^\J^J

\

,1^3

** a reasonable location to be designated by

Her, subject to Section Q Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with
s Agreement Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of JS^date of possession •
9 POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on

^j O t y

10 AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Agreement the listing agent
d the selling agent

d^Atv A

^ x J , [( ( ^ vti j

date of closing •

i , I^ ^ ^

other

unless extended by written agreement of parties

/*lCl^A)7

^UL! , / / / *r*X

represents {^Seller ( ) Buyer,

represents^ ) Sellerfr^Buyer Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement

itten disclosure of the agency relationships) was provided to him/her ££tf{

) Buyer's initials (

)(

) Seller's initials

11 GENERAL PROVISIONS UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN
XEPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE
12 AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions Seller shall
ive untilil ^ "•(?/) (AMffffi)
ONEY tolfie Buyer

/rt*/ ^
/

, 19 *?^

to accept this offer Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST

l-v*cr.

uyer Signafu re)
uyers

^IS^R
(Date)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSWTAX ID)

uyer's Signature)

(Date)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

AJZ^

HECK ONE
3 ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above
3 M I C T I O N Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer

(Seller's initials)

&TOUNTER OFFER Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance Buyer shall have until.
(AM/PM)
, 19
to accept the terms
specified below

teller's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID

(Date)

(Time)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID

,HECK ONE
3 ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER
D REJECTION Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER

(Buyer's Initials)

D COUNTER OFFER Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum

Buyer's Signature)

(Date)

(Buyer's Signature)

(Time)

(Date)

(Time)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
iokir to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed
.eipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing ail signatures
•IGNATl

I

I ^

SIGNATURE OF
OF BUYER
BUYER
SIGNATURE

/~y — y

c^
Date

Date

B D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on.

Date

,19.

K AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on ifc behalf warran
his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller
L COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels ar
md all prior negotiations representations warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agre<
Tient This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties
M COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and, if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreemer
tot expressly modified or excluded therein
N DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damage
»r to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express conditio
•r contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned t
tuyer Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses
tcludmg a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by ap
licable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an in
rpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from th<
arnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shal
e interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney'!
•es incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action
O ABROGATION. Except for express warranties'made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement
P RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property betweer
e date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percenl
0%) of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property
tor to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repaii
replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed
Q TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes,
9, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing
te shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter,
te is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and
livered by all parties to the transaction
R CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (%) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise reqmred by the lending institution Costs of providing
9 insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest
assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer
closing
> REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those exited herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract, Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed,
Gaining Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real
ate contract therein
NOTICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence
he event with respect to which notice is required If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given
utomatically terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the
tet or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice
BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office
DAYS. For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays
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ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes

( ) a COUNTER OFFER

SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the
/^JAuSfcN

I S

as buyer(s), and

day of

( ) an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY

£VfcV

, 1 ^ 3 3 - . between

O c O A 5 t T ? ^

as seller(s),

covering real property described as follows

O^LjiKr , (VTftB
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT.

t IMS C^^ILYt

l£» Q O ^ T \ ^ ^ T

OTsL T W ^ -Q^lltsc^ ib>o

^

l ^ i ^ * T,^ T^yvu
Kotv^ ^r>^f HOT e/fosy 'BuycuL, X) r»c^v^/ Golfer*
m c>j> Turing o ^ o ^ . XS^ciwc C T c y ^ ^ 3 , ^ ^ ( 3 ^

All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same ( ^ Seller ( ) Buyer shall have until

frVA) <1
Date

1941.. to accept the terms specified above

Fh^N t^> 1 ^ 3

1"<5 ^

Time

^ " ^ Q

(A M / F ^ >

Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse

Signature of (

(AM/PM)

~~Z/J

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTER OFFER REJECTION

the foregoing on the terms specified above
the foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached
3d Addendum

{

) I hereby reject the foregoing

Signature
(Initials)

Date

A
Time

DOCUMENT RECEIPT

acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures

(%~c*<u

(

Signature of Buyer(sl
Date
Signature of Seller(s)
) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on

19
Sent by

by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer

Date

S>^~9

ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes fcx) a COUNTER OFFER
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the JJ5

Madsen

as

(

) an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY

day of May

buyer(s). and

, ig93

, between

Swart z

as

seiier(s),

covering real property described as follows:

841 SW Hoytsville Rd.
Coalville, Utah
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of T H E A G R E E M E N T .

The following terms shall be incorporated into the agreement;
1. Buyer to pay for any and all survey and legal work, as may be required
to create the parcel under this contract.
2.It shall be at the Sellers option to elect to continue with this
contract, pending the seller obtaining a contract on the adjoining
17 acres. The seller will notify the buyer of his decision by no
later than June -fr»rl993.

3_J*

0+r~

All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same. (

May 2Q
^V A

.

19 9 3

) Seller (x^ Buyer shaiJ have until

, to accept the terms specified above Un^i

Date.

5 ; 00

jfccM /P.M.)

ddendum shall lapse,
uyer

Signatur*
(A.M^M>)

Time

ACCEPT ANCE'COUNTER OFFER REJECTION

Check/One
(L^H hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above.
( ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum.
£

/Signature

Signature

Date

{

) I hereby reject the foregoing .

(

) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures.

Time

. (Initials)
DOCUMENT RECEIPT

Signature of Buyer(s)
(

Date

Signature of Seller(s)

) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on

19
Sent by

, by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the (

) Seller (

) Buyer

Date

H5«

EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT

I f

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT

| |

N0(0)

*•**>

fie undersigned Buyer —

EXHIBIT
?

hereby deposits with Brokerage

EARNEST MONEY, the amount of

F»OrV

ko^^tyg.Q

:h shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law.
kerage

fr

*°/~t,*±*y-

•

"~~

Dollars ( P f S m ^

/*f"—"N

x

).

A

Phone Number
OFFER TO PURCHASE

. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MJJNEY is grverr ta secure and appty on the purchase opht property situated at A l M
?HI

£>t£> H ^ v H S o i l l f c ^

, n the City of

CVTftL^itlt.

County of

^ L > T v rTv l T

/ £>

_

, Utah,

lect to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility orjxther easements or nghts of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in
wdancetwith Section G. Said property is owned by

C^>( f^ ^ n f T \

Tv^rpd&y £> -"523* agaaa
HECK APPLICABLE BOXES/*** 1 * *

c

*

as sellers, and is more particularly described

m

PIPITS.. To^toUfruJ \H yarr,->rrvi, *fr.gy^V

w

*

^UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

D Vacant Lot

3 IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

• Commercial

^ V a c a n t Acreage
D Residential

• Other

• Condo

.

,

D Other

(a) Included items. Unless'exciuded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section -A if presently attached to the~propetty.
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title.

HOMY

.

(b) Excluded Item*. The following items are specifically excludedfromthis sale:.
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price
13 public sewer O connected
S septic tank

£fy well

C3 connected

G connected

Q other

y K ^ irrigation water / secondary system

0 other sanitary system

# of *****

TT\fi

9 public water X 3 connected

CS TV antenna

3 pnvate water

C natural gas

Q connected

E:bonnected

y&^electnaty

Q ingress &-egress by private easement

Company

tested toad

O master antenna £ 3 prewired

^Cpaved

& curb and gutter

Q connected

Q other rights

Dnor t0
y*+J
pnor to cclosing^S^
(d) Survey. A certified survey Q shall be furnished at the expense of
j^^
^ ' ^ g y ^ sns*N n^t be furnished
(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property ana subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it iin its present physics

condition, except: _

FtytTtS>J

PURCHASE PfllCE AND FINANCING. The total purchase pnce for the property is

Dollars ( i ^ t
5 c O
lo<3C>
_£2

D principal;

^ ^

) which shall be paid as follows

% per annum with monthly payments of $
D interest,

D taxes;

• insurance;

D condo fees;

dother

representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to b
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at
D pnnctpal;

D interest;

D taxes,

% per annum with monthly payments of $ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Q insurance;

D condo fees,

D other

representing balance* if any, including proceeds trom-B«-*ew«<*e*§«9ertea*pef setter financing, to be paid AS follows:

CAiXtty S ^ * ,

VjOQO

^ Q &

representingihe approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyei

which include:

&

/

/frvatr*0/*

representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing.

which indude:

i ^ / Q C P

^

t k ^ o s A ^

which represents the aforedescnbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT:

which obligation bears interest at
£**

,

£ »

^>cU^T\,T^

IJ* Tnu-rr TVg^P # g ^ U t n r n . ^ny .v^csrts t o 3 c A t ^:*Uo«usV

WLWCICAL

7<tL^L?CT^iv

&h*tl

"Be

Q\l

*

3i*

I^OCVTV

<,)*,

lytLfiZL^/rSS

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

f Buyer is required to assume an underlying.obligation <tn which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best effon
assume and/or procure same and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agree
make application within. N I K
interest rate not to exceed | Q tfr

_ days after Setter's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new-^nflrlclng i
%. If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within

h-) ^

days after Seller's acceptahc

this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice. Seller agrees to pay up to fr^S ^
mts, not to exceed $

[Q ^

, in addition, seller agrees to pay $

l\3

fcr

to be used for Buyer's other loan costs.

mortgage loan discoui

ON AND c g n v t T A m * v r . . . « _ *~..w. , ^ ,
act Transfer of Seller's ownership interest shall be made as set forth Fn Section S. Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable tme to the property subject
dBrract
orance* and exceptions rioted hirtn, evidenced byN^a "current policy of title insurance in the amount, of purchase" price d an abetracTof mie brought ournwri^
^moranc
attorney's opinion (See Section H). ,
*^
'* %
h attorney
INSPECTION OF TITLE, m accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunitytoJnjpect the Wetothe subject property prior TO dosing. Buyer that talcs title
atoai.y enstmg restnetrve oovenapts,^inciuding condominium reetn£bpns (CO A a).
R'a).Buyer
Buyer
h a s yhas
has
reviewed
an^oonjdominium C u * R'spnor
signingthis
toAgr eameiJt^
toto
signing
UU
hasX
notnot
reviewed
an^oondominiumCu4R'i
VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows:
ftpyZSK.
" V " } " j f r T T l ^ f ^ V M ^ ~^>T>JlfMt. *Tfo Q A p j S f T f r * * .

lie

, SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted: ^ V \ ^ > T & ^
ptions to the above and Section C shall be limitedtothe. following:!.
. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subjecttotrie following special cw>tftk)ns^anoVbr contir»c^^k^iesJrfilch, must be^aansflec?

CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be dosed oo or before ^ u V v /

±

.. 1 9 ^ L 2 L a t a reasonable,location to. be designatedJby.

>r, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shaM deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with
Agreement Prorations set forth in Section R snail be made as of ^JB date of possession D date of dosing D other"
I. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on

"ft *TH. e>^ c+ (x*t < *- 5Junless
unlessextended
extendedbyi
by written agreement of parties,
.representsV ^^Seller f " } Buyer';
/t^j{
}***'**

I AQgMCV PtSCLOSUPE At m« rigninp of thi> AQnmmant ttm lifting «gimt % MstK Af

the selling agent

^y^(NJ& ( > ^ » i*)**S

represents f ) Seller Qi^LBuytr- Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement

en disclosure of the agency relationship^) was providedtorum/her. |^£>4 (

> Buyer's initials ( .*• ) {

\ Setter's initiatSL

1. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE*SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEK
JEPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE.
2. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME UMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers'to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Setter aha*
s tinttt3"-£XS (AMfgfrfr / M A V l ^
v
NEY to the Buvjar.
—*
'

>r

^ — » —

rWs iSignature)

yer's Signature)

, 1 0 ^ 3 , to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shaU lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST
~
*."."*
'

(Date)

(Address)

Pate)

(Address)

/

(

P

h

o

n

e

)

(SSN/TAX ID]

{Phone)

(SSN/TAXTD

ECKONE
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS theforegoingoffer on the teems and conditions specified above.
R U C T I O N . Seller hereby REJECTS the foregomg offer

(Seller's initials)

''COUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or In'the attached Addendum, ar*
•resents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance/Buyer shall have until
ipecified below.

sfler's Signature)

(AM/PM)

* (Date)

(Time)

(Address)

(Date)

(Time)

(Address)

, 19

j»jt

to accept the term

(Phone)

(SSNtfTAX ||
II
(SSN/TAX

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX II

4ECK ONE:
1 ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER
2 REJECTION. Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER.

(Buyers Initials)

3 COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum.

Oyer's Signature)

Pate)

(Time)

(Buyer's Signature)

(Date)

fTlme)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State Law requires looker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be complete
A. • I ££Qovd£cJ9® feflsip^of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement
bearing all
all signatures:
signatures:
jreement beanng
/

/

SIGNATURE OF BUYERL,

B. G I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on.
*«-„ _ „ _ 4 —
^ *> the • SeHer DBuyer. Sent by
lm4 mHakf^mA ^

k -^~—.

."aosa
..19.

ADDENDUM/COUNTEROFFER
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
Thit ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes

(

) a COUNTER OFFER 7?S • " ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY

SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT}4at«d tb«
/^ft~t>*>t>l

L 5

day of

„ buyer(s). and

covering real properly described as follows

A ^

A

^

,T « l ^

hatwawn

<So^<VCrt_
_

aasetter(s).

.

The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT

X^ILtk

CjRHi
Q\4

tLVX. " b n > \ O t . / S / * » » y i > y y o T » » H »"&cy*JT*-X

SCPO H O j / T g u i l l C
t k c ^ o o t U

tfc^

CC>AI1

f\roz>

T V e .

1*><^ Q K A T ^ a

t->o»%«- l i CoOA.e»vrrL^

(">-£

A c a e .

Qg>»vraACT

All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same fttf Seller (

>c^TVv.

Soo^k

c^r4 o ^ w 3 t r c ^ »

) Buyer shall have until

V)»«^mCo^^^cT

^tW^tvry

^»***. l£i H I S -

Q * Q Q

(A

Mf^jfr)

, to accept the terms specified above Unless so acceptectthis Addendum shall lapse
Date

N^W & i n ? ^
:

Time

* 1 tS

?A\

- — « _

Signature of ( ) Seller f ^ g u y e r

(AM/PM)

/ /

C

H = ^

<^

'

ACCEPTANCE COUNTER OFFER REJECTION

Check One
(

) I hereby ACCEPT ihe foregoing on the terms specified above

sd Addendum
(C^nNereby T ^ Q ^ ? v h e foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached
Addendum
Signature
(* ) I hereby reject the foregoing

Signature
(Initials)

Date

*
Tim*

DOCUMENT RECEIPT

(

) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures

l^cx^Q
Signature of Buyer(s)
(

Date

Signature of SeUer(s)

) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on

19

by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the (

Sent by
This form has been eoDroved bv the Utah Real Estate Commission

) Seller ( ) Buyer

Date

ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes- 4X) * COUNTEROFFER
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the
Kadsen

1$

day of

asbuyer(s) and

< ) an ADDENDUM lo that EARNEST MONEY

Maj

t

J 9 _ i 2 . , between

Swartz

asseiter(s).

covenng real property described as follows

/

2.84 acres ad1. 841 SV Boytsvllle
Coalville, Utah

The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT*

1. Seller to hold a mortgage of $13,000 9 8Z interest. Interest to be paid
seal-annually with the first payment due on Jan 1,1994 and every (6)
six months thereafter. Interest paynent to be based on outstanding

principal. Principal yaymenA to be a bailqn,jMb_the ytd tof j60 months..
There will be no pre-paypent penalty.
2.This contract shall invltide 1.5 shares of water. Title to the water shares
shall ^remainfwith the seller until the note is paid in fulll
3. IT shall be*\t the^eller's option to continue with this contractf pgnrHng
seller obtaining a contract on the adjoining 17 acres. Seller -must notify
buyer in writing by no later than June ^ , 1 9 9 3
^VA*—

All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same (
.My

20
J

Date

jg

'*^y

) Seller ( x ) Buyer shall have until

5:00

p f t * /p M )

9 3 to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted fhjs Addendum shall lapse

*

,

t

^

Signature o/ iflj Sfe$)4rflff) JBuyer

4

Time

ACC&TAriCE/COUrtTfa OFFER REJfCTjbN
Chec£j0ne
( * T I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above
( ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum
I

Signature

Signature

Date

(

) I hereby reject the foregoing

(

) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures

(

Signature of Buyers)
Date
Signature ohbeiler(s)
) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on

Time

(Initials)
DOCUMENT RECEIPT

19
Sent by

, by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer

rbuh*
Date

